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█ Abstract Contrary to what Descartes argued many centuries ago, the self seems far from being a simple 
and indivisible entity, easily accessible to personal scrutiny. In this paper I will endorse an anti-Cartesian 
attitude, starting from two different perspectives. On the one hand, I will consider clinical and develop-
mental studies showing how strongly interpersonal relations modulate the quality of introspective access. 
In this section, I will take into account Neisser’s theory of self-knowledge and Gergely and Watson’s con-
structivist approach. On the other hand, I will consider the extended mind paradigm, a recent philosophi-
cal model that seems compatible with the idea that some important aspects of the self may extend to the 
physical world. This latter point acquires special importance when considering how widespread certain 
electronic tools such as second generation search engines will be in the future. 
KEYWORDS: Self; Levels of Self-knowledge; Nativism; Constructivism; Extended Mind; Extended Self. 
 
█ Riassunto Dalla culla a internet. La natura sociale dell’identità personale – Contrariamente a quanto af-
fermato da Cartesio parecchi secoli fa, il sé non sembra affatto essere un’entità semplice e indivisibile, fa-
cilmente accessibile all’auto-indagine. In questo articolo assumerò un atteggiamento anticartesiano, par-
tendo da due diverse prospettive. Da una parte, prenderò in considerazione studi clinici e di psicologia 
dello sviluppo che mostrano quanto fortemente le relazioni interpersonali modulino la qualità dell’accesso 
introspettivo. In questa parte farò riferimento soprattutto alla teoria della conoscenza di sé di Neisser e 
all’approccio costruttivista di Gergely e Watson. In secondo luogo mi confronterò con il paradigma della 
mente estesa, un modello filosofico recente che pare compatibile con l’idea che alcuni aspetti importanti 
del sé possano venire estesi al mondo fisico. Questo secondo punto acquisisce un’importanza particolare 
quando si consideri fino a che grado alcuni strumenti elettronici come i motori di ricerca di seconda gene-
razione saranno diffusi nel futuro. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Sé; Livelli di conoscenza sel Sé; Innatismo; Costruttivismo; Mente estesa; Sé esteso. 
 
 
 
█ The Self among the Others 
 
«I KNOW PAINLY THAT I can achieve an 
easier and more evident perception of my 
own mind than of anything else »,1 said Des-
cartes almost four centuries ago, but today 
we know that he was wrong. A more specific 
quotation is particularly controversial: 
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There is a great difference between the 
mind and the body, inasmuch as the body 
is by its very nature always divisible, while 
the mind is utterly indivisible. For when I 
consider the mind,or myself in so far as I 
am merely a thinking thing, I am unable 
to distinguish any parts within myself; I 
understand myself to be something quite 
single and complete.2 
 
On the contrary, many neuroscientific 
studies show that different levels of con-
sciousness, along with the related senses of 
identity they trigger, coexist in one and the 
same person, but sometimes one of them 
breaks down (e.g., Damasio).3 In a develop-
mental psychological perspective, some deca-
des ago Ulric Neisser4 individuated five kinds 
of knowledge of the self, starting from the 
most elementary structure up to the full-
blown metacognitive self-identity:  
 
- ecological self  
- interpersonal self 
- extended self 
- private self 
- conceptual self 
 
Despite the title of Neisser’s article, only 
the last three levels of self-awareness corre-
spond to genuine forms of knowledge. In 
point of fact, the ecological and interpersonal 
selves are structures of self-information 
which, in a Gibsonian perspective, are im-
plicit in each act of perception. The very act 
of perceiving anything, be it an external ob-
ject or an inner event, carries with it the per-
ception of ourselves as perspectival agents. 
The ecological self is the very precocious self 
as perceived with respect to the physical 
world. To describe with an adult sentence 
what an infant pre-linguistically feels, we 
could say that she is implicitly aware of being 
a physical object among other physical ob-
jects. But the ecological self is also aware of 
being a special physical object: it is the agent, 
the actor who «initiates movements, per-
ceives their consequences, and takes pleasure 
in its own effectivity».5 
The interpersonal self, which is also very 
precocious, is the self as perceived specifical-
ly with respect to the agentive world: “I am 
an agent among other agents, and we are all 
engaged in this agentive interchange”. It re-
fers to the awareness of being an agentive 
body who stands in relationship – or seeks to 
stay in relationship – with other agents. 
The extended self is constituted by our 
memories and anticipations of experienced 
events. It corresponds to the level of self-
knowledge that gets paradigmatically de-
stroyed in amnesia. As Antonio Damasio has 
shown with his extensive analysis of neuro-
psychological data, even the most severe 
forms of amnesia preserve timeless, more 
primitive but not less important aspects of 
this kind of instantaneous self-awareness. 
The private self, which can be viewed as 
the most similar structure with respect to the 
Cartesian tradition, corresponds to the sense 
of having a particular mental perspective, a 
special point of view which is not automati-
cally shared with others. “I am a thinking 
(and also perceiving, desiring, fearing) res, 
and my beliefs (perceptions, desires, fears) 
are the cause of my behavior”. 
Finally, the conceptual self is the self struc-
tured in categories, “personal labels” that 
both ourselves and others attach to us: “I am 
a woman, a wife, a mother, a professor, a lo-
ver of J.S. Bach and pizza margherita, and so 
forth”. This conceptual dimension is modu-
lated on an ongoing basis throughout life as a 
person takes part in a culture, a society, a 
group. G.H. Mead intensively studied the so-
cial self from a sociological perspective, in 
order to better understand the process of in-
tegration, and – in his view – the formation 
of a new identity by USA immigrants at the 
beginning of the XXth century.6 
The composite nature of self-awareness 
not only falsifies the illusion of a unitary self, 
but also challenges another Cartesian illu-
sion, i.e., the idea of the “autonomy” of the 
subject who, in order to know herself, has on-
ly to “look inside”.  
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Indeed, in this paper I shall argue that (1) 
all the levels of self-information and self-
knowledge correspond to informational 
structures somehow influenced by interac-
tions; and that (2) even some aspects of the 
inanimate world (e.g., electronic tools) could 
intervene in the structuring process of the 
self. In the following, I will continue to refer 
to Neisser’s five levels to highlight some rele-
vant points. 
 
█ Social relations and the mind 
 
Lev S. Vygotsky7 is probably the most bril-
liant defender of the idea that, in all its di-
mensions, knowledge, and specifically self-
knowledge, has a social nature. The adult’s 
scaffolding8 helps the child to develop her 
cognitive capacities in any domain, including 
self-knowledge. As shown by the Vygotskian 
example concerning how the young child 
comes to understand the meaning of the 
pointing gesture, each level of comprehen-
sion is reached within a social context and 
only later is progressively interiorized. While 
at the beginning the child simply directs her 
arm at an object trying to reach it, the adult 
immediately and spontaneously understands 
the gesture’s communicative meaning. As a 
consequence, the adult satisfies the child’s 
desire, giving the child the requested object. 
Finally, that externalized meaning is sha-
red and interiorized by the child: a failed 
grasping movement has now become a suc-
cessful communicative action. According to 
Vygotsky, the same process of progressive 
interiorization characterizes the develop-
ment of self-knowledge:  
 
The social dimension of consciousness is 
primary in time and in fact. The individu-
al dimension of consciousness is deriva-
tive and secondary.9 
 
Actually, Vygotsky’s constructivism is 
committed to a radical empirical framework 
that can no longer be defended, in view of 
the large amount of data showing that the 
human mind is far from being a tabula rasa 
at birth. From this perspective, Neisser and 
other researchers I will examine in what fol-
lows should be considered as the contempo-
rary heirs of the Vygotskian tradition. For 
example, authors such as Watson, Bahrich 
and Gergely defend a nativist idea according 
to which some conceptual structures and 
mechanisms are innate and already at work 
since infancy, while they cautiously avoid 
postulating a mind already-mature-at-birth. 
According to Gergely and Watson,10 even 
the ecological self, i.e., the most primitive 
form of self-awareness, crucially contains so-
cial elements. In a well known experiment,11 
young children are given the option of choos-
ing between two videos to watch, one featur-
ing their own legs moving in real time, the 
other featuring the movements of another 
child of their own age whom they cannot di-
stinguish as another child, because all the 
children wear identical clothes. Or, in a dif-
ferent experimental condition, the video does 
not show another child, but the same chil-
dren-watchers, who can look at themselves in 
a delayed video showing their previous be-
havior. Clearly, the online images of the chil-
dren’s own bodies represent synchronously 
and faithfully their movements, whereas the 
alternative movie (both in the “other child” 
and in the “delayed” conditions) represents a 
different situation, insofar as another person 
(or a past, desynchronized self) is involved. 
Following Neisser’s levels of self-know-
ledge, it seems reasonable to associate the 
first, perfectly synchronized representation, 
with the representation of the ecological self, 
as the perceived movements mirror the mo-
vements of the child’s body and correspond 
to her agentive feelings. To the extent that 
the delayed images (again, in both the “other” 
and in the “delayed self” conditions) do not 
perfectly refer to the child’s current move-
ments, they can be taken to represent another 
agent potentially engaged in a social ex-
change. 
Children turn out to be capable of dis-
criminating between the first situation, 
From Cradle to Internet 
 
285 
which in the authors’ terminology is perfectly 
contingent, and the second one, which is 
highly but less than perfectly contingent. 
Thus, they seem capable of distinguishing 
between themselves and their peers on the 
basis of temporal-causal contingencies. No 
less notably, they show a clear preference 
trend that depends on their age. Children 
younger than three-months significantly pre-
fer to look at their own moving bodies. They 
are attracted by the image of their bodily-
agentive self: the ecological self. 
In contrast, four-month-old children pre-
fer to observe the other child or the delayed 
self-image. Now, what could be the meaning 
of the change of preference systematically 
evidenced around the end of the third 
month? Why do children almost invariably12 
begin to prefer less than perfectly contingent 
images? 
This reversal of preference seems to indi-
cate a growth of interest in the social world. 
Unlike the actions we ourselves plan and per-
form, other people’s movements are never 
perfectly contingent with ours. Even when 
someone is imitating us (as we will see is 
common in infant-adult communicative ex-
changes), she never perfectly mirrors our 
movements. 
We can thus turn to the second dimen-
sion of self-knowledge (or, we should rather 
say, self-perception): the interpersonal self. 
The interpersonal self, which still does not 
require concepts, is a precocious level of self-
awareness corresponding to the ability of 
perceiving ourselves as distinct from other 
agents and interacting with them in a peculi-
ar way, which is different from the way the 
ecological self interacts with inanimate ob-
jects. Therefore, thanks to this developmen-
tal step, self-knowledge assumes a still more 
explicit relational nature. 
Children begin to engage in social rela-
tionships at two-three months. Yet, even if 
distinct and easily recognizable, in the inter-
personal domain primitive self-awareness is 
also built on the basis of dynamic cues. What 
is at stake in this case is no longer something 
like the perception of an approximating ob-
ject, but rather the dynamics of reciprocal in-
teractions with other agents. The prototypi-
cal interactive exchanges occur during proto-
conversations, the most common context of 
dyadic, emotional relationships involving a 
child and her caregiver.13 Both partners ac-
tively interact, reciprocally exchanging in-
formation during a conversation made of imi-
tations (but also of subtle episodes of desyn-
chronization), improvisations, search for eye-
to-eye contact, sensitivity to vital forms,14 
and so forth. 
To reach the three more advanced levels of 
self-knowledge, concept possession is re-
quired. We can also define these three levels as 
metacognitive, since they imply conceptual 
analysis of the mind; nevertheless, it is possi-
ble that children achieve at least some early 
conceptual understanding of their mind func-
tioning in an implicit, prelinguistic way. It is 
such a theoretical attitude that is endorsed in 
the framework sketched by Gergely and Wat-
son.15 They suggest not only that the bases of 
the private self (i.e., the third level in Neisser’s 
framework) are precocious, but also that 
(good) intersubjectivity is needed to ensure a 
(good) maturational process. Their hypothesis 
is based on the functioning of a psychological 
mechanism which is innate but needs the in-
tervention of other agents to be triggered and 
to be maintained in good functioning. 
In this perspective, it is considered that 
the child is innately tuned to develop intro-
spective capacities. Yet, Gergely and Watson 
criticize many contemporary authors work-
ing from different perspectives,16 who, sub-
scribing to a psychological perspective that 
can be traced back to Freud himself, take for 
granted that the child is capable of introspec-
tion and able to recognize her emotions from 
her first weeks of life. By contrast, according 
to Gergely and Watson introspection is the 
outcome of a developmental process whose 
success depends on the input of other human 
beings, possibly well attuned to the child. 
Specifically, the child acquires sensitivity to 
her emotions and sensations through a pro-
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cess of social biofeedback, an expression 
which indicates the social application of a 
phenomenon well known to physiologists. 
Take a physiological state (e.g., blood 
pressure) that a person is unaware of, and 
continuously monitor this physiological di-
mension by mapping it onto an external per-
ceptible device – e.g., a gauge. It is well estab-
lished that the feedback provided by repeat-
ed exposures to such external representations 
progressively makes the person conscious of 
her internal processes.17 According to Gerge-
ly and Watson, in the interpersonal domain a 
similar social biofeedback is provided by 
adults’ marked mirroring of infantile emo-
tional expressions, especially in the context of 
protoconversations.  
At the beginning, the baby experiences 
emotions only as undifferentiated states, and 
is unable to connect her internal undifferen-
tiated feelings and dispositions to any emo-
tional category. This learning process takes 
place with the intervention of an attuned 
caregiver, who plays the role of the gauge in 
blood pressure sensitization. The adult inter-
prets and mirrors infantile facial and postural 
expressions, letting her connect her feelings 
to an external, perceptually accessible catego-
ry. The process of biofeedback is thus trig-
gered, and will complete with a full-blown 
capacity.18 
Turning now to a clinical dimension, 
Bowlby’s attachment theoretical framework19 
is probably the clearest demonstration of the 
impact of personal interactions even on the 
most mature levels of self-knowledge. Many 
years of rigorous observations of child-
caregiver interactions led Bowlby to distin-
guish four different styles of attachment: se-
cure, avoidant, resistant-ambivalent, and di-
sorganized. Even though the secure attach-
ment style turns out to be the most desirable 
condition with respect to all the others, the 
most important distinction for our present 
discussion is the one between organized and 
disorganized attachment. After all, secure, 
avoidant, and resistant-ambivalent are all at-
tachment styles characterized by a degree of 
organization that varies from optimality to 
sufficiency. 
Even the resistant-ambivalent style, while 
presenting an intrinsic dichotomy and insta-
bility, still maintains an acceptable level of 
coherence. In contrast, coherence is com-
pletely missing in disorganized attachment, 
which is not infrequent in dyads where the 
adult has recently suffered from a loss. Under 
such conditions the caregiver, who is sup-
posed to offer protection, is himself in need 
of being cared for, thus forcing the baby to 
reverse her natural role. Moreover, the simple 
physical presence of the child often evokes to 
the adult the absent person, soliciting painful 
episodic memories and thus provoking fur-
ther intense suffering, which in tur-n can 
trigger violent or otherwise dysfunctional re-
actions. As a consequence the child, who is 
just a fragile person to be taken care of, ends 
up assuming three incompatible and patho-
genic roles at the same time: Persecutor, Res-
cuer, and Victim.20 
According to Bowlby, traces of each inter-
action are registered in the Internal Working 
Models (IWMs), an intrinsically interpersonal 
mnemonic organization which structures the 
autobiographical-narrative dimension of self-
consciousness,21 i.e., the most refined dimen-
sion of self-knowledge in Neisser’s list. It fol-
lows that the child with disorganized at-
tachment, because of the multiple roles she 
has to play, progressively constructs a self-
image with a high and dangerous level of in-
coherence. 
It is therefore clear that self-consciousness, 
which in the Bowlbian tradition has an explicit 
interpersonal dimension, cannot but suffer 
when interpersonal relations are strongly dys-
functional, as frequently happens in disor-
ganized attachment styles. When the sense of 
self cannot reach an acceptable level of co-
herence and continuity, pathological condi-
tions frequently occur. As a matter of fact, 
disorganized attachment styles (and disor-
ganized IWMs) strongly correlate with adult 
personality and dissociative disorders, such 
as borderline personality disorders and disso-
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ciative identity disorders. 
Concerning more specifically the concep-
tual self, i.e., the self which is the conceptual-
ized image of how other people perceive us, 
its social dimension is obvious, intrinsic to its 
definition. Without interpersonal relation-
ships one has no mirror image to be con-
fronted with, and intense suffering tends to 
follow. Referring only to the social self (but, 
as Bowlby heirs, we could say the same with 
regard to the interpersonal self), William 
James wrote: 
 
No more fiendish punishment could be 
devised, were such a thing physically pos-
sible, than that one should be turned loose 
in society and remain absolutely unno-
ticed by all the members thereof. If no 
one turned round when we entered, an-
swered when we spoke, or minded what 
we did, but if every person we met “cut us 
dead”, and acted as if we were non-
existing things, a kind of rage and impo-
tent despair would ere long well up in us, 
from which the cruellest bodily tortures 
would be a relief; for these would make us 
feel that, however bad might be our 
plight, we had not sunk to such a depth as 
to be unworthy of attention at all.22 
  
█ The Self in the Net 
 
Having seen how crucially other persons 
are involved in the modulation of personal 
identity, we now turn to investigating wheth-
er interactions with certain kinds of objects 
could somewhat impact some aspects of self-
identity. Obviously, as we saw in the previous 
pages, interaction with the world is im-
portant to constitute the bodily-agentive self, 
i.e., the sense that our body has boundaries 
and can act on objects, for example to move 
them. Since his seminal work Principles of 
Psychology, William James put forward a 
stronger position: 
 
The same object being sometimes treated 
as a part of me, at other times as simply 
mine, and then again as if I had nothing 
to do with it at all. In its widest possible 
sense, however, a man’s Self is the sum total 
of all that he CAN call his, not only his 
body and his psychic powers, but his 
clothes and his house, his wife and chil-
dren, his ancestors and friends, his repu-
tation and works, his lands and horses, 
and yacht and bank-account. All these 
things give him the same emotions.23 
 
The only constraint to satisfy in order to 
become part of the material self (the Me, in 
James’ terminology) is that we feel “warmth 
and intimacy” about those external objects. 
While being persuaded that James’ provoca-
tive claims contain some very interesting 
suggestions that could be useful to analyze 
into details, in this paper I am mainly inte-
rested in the more contemporary issue of ex-
ploring whether continuous interaction with 
technological tools may somehow affect any 
dimension of personal identity. 
Imagine connecting your brain to an elec-
tronic tool that instantaneously calculates 
any logarithm or, if you prefer, the quickest 
way to your home: would your mind be ex-
tended to that tool? And would you become 
smarter? 
This kind of questions characterizes the 
Extended Mind Model, first proposed by 
Andy Clark and David Chalmers24 and then 
elaborated by Clark and other authors,25 but 
openly reminiscent of Lev Vygotsky’s work.26 
Not every external computational tool can 
become a mental extension. To constrain the 
mental domain Clark and Chalmers propose 
the Parity Principle (PP): 
 
If, as we confront some task, a part of the 
world functions as a process which, were 
it to go on in the head, we would have no 
hesitation in accepting as part of the cog-
nitive process, then that part of the world 
is (for that time) part of the cognitive 
process.27 
 
PP is clearly a functionalist principle, as it 
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distinguishes mental facts on the basis of the 
functional role of processes and representa-
tions. Provided that they play the appropri-
ate causal role, even non-biological elements 
can become part of the mental. Moreover, 
the same element can be part of the mental 
on some occasion, while in other situations, 
when it lacks the relevant causal role, it is ex-
pelled from the mind. What PP suggests then 
is a dynamic and fuzzy-bounded concept of 
the mind. 
Yet some further constraints delimit the 
ontological liberalism implied by PP: (1) the 
external resource should be reliably available 
and typically invoked; (2) any information 
retrieved should be more or less automatical-
ly endorsed, (3) easily accessible and (4) con-
sciously endorsed at some point in the past. 
According to (1) and (3), my old dusty 
encyclopedia in the garage is not (at least, no 
longer) part of my mind, while (2) requires 
that we (ceteribus paribus) trust the source, 
thus making questionable, inter alia, other 
people’s advice. The strongest criterion, (4), 
has been considered too restrictive by Clark 
himself.28 After all, one of the main findings 
of the cognitive sciences has been that con-
scious processes are the tip of the iceberg: for 
reasons that are different from those postu-
lated by Freud, the vast majority of mental 
processes have to be considered implicit, un-
conscious. Empirical data do not allow any 
doubt on this point. 
Concerning the first three points, it is also 
noticeable that they are somehow remini-
scent of James’ affective requirement. Hav-
ing an external resource easily available and 
accessible, and trusting it, amounts in an im-
portant sense to feeling warmth and intimacy 
towards it. The four criteria (together with 
PP) are captured by the notion of transparen-
cy: transparent technologies are those tools 
that are so well integrated with our internal 
processes that they are no longer noticed. We 
will return to this point later. 
Actually, some authors29 put into question 
the four principles. According to Gallagher, 
the three criteria (he already excludes (4)) are 
a matter of degree rather than having an all-
or-nothing nature. For example, while violat-
ing (1) and (3), many institutional and collec-
tive practices (in his example, the legal code) 
could well be part of the minds of some peo-
ple. Concerning (2), Gallagher invites us to 
imagine someone who, having a skeptical at-
titude, almost always puts acquired infor-
mation in doubt. Well, the same careful scru-
tiny he continuously performs makes the in-
formation thereby acquired a genuine part of 
that person’s mind. 
After all, judgment is a mental activity, 
and it takes part in the internal mind. 
Though interesting, Gallagher’s claim is not 
decisive for our purposes. Even if we decide 
to reject his objections, thus taking the ex-
tended mind into the boundaries originally 
stated by Clark and Chalmers, what I am go-
ing to discuss could still be relevant. 
 
█ Externalizing our senses 
 
Proponents of the Extended Mind Model 
spend many pages on describing various 
kinds of technological tools that widen the 
mental domain outside the head. No doubt 
one of the most interesting examples is con-
stituted by the complex implants that help 
neurological patients to recover some aspects 
of their lost perceptual or motor abilities. A 
paradigmatic case is constituted by the well 
known Bach-y-Rita implant, which, exploit-
ing tactile stimulation instead of vision, helps 
blind people to somehow “see” the world. 
A few decades ago, the neuroscientist 
Bach-y-Rita developed a technological de-
vice, the Tactile Vision Substitution System, 
whose functioning is based on a video cam-
era put on the head of a blind person. The 
scene coming from the external environment 
is transduced into vibratory stimuli that are 
displayed on the person’s back.30  
Soon after the beginning of the experi-
ment, blind people reported that they be-
came able to exploit the camera as seeing 
people currently use their eyes: to analyze the 
visual scene in front of them, search and rec-
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ognize objects, and so forth. The tactile stim-
uli they received were reportedly processed 
as “quasi-visual” information. Other experi-
mental data,31 showing that we can enlarge 
our phenomenal body to include tools such 
as sticks, confirm that the sensorial body can 
be augmented by more or less sophisticated 
tools. 
Overall, I take these data to highlight a 
very important point, generally underesti-
mated because of the greater spectacularity 
of Clark and Chalmers’ “cognitive” examples, 
such as the case of Otto and Inga described 
in the next section. In fact, I take the percep-
tual-sensorial examples seen above as rele-
vant not only to the discussion concerning 
the possible extensions of the mind: they also 
suggest that some aspects of the self can be 
extended outside the brain. In fact, what 
blind people in Bach-y-Rita’s experiment re-
port is an augmentation of their phenomenal 
experience. We will return to this topic at the 
end of the paper. 
 
█ From Otto to Mary 
 
Clark and Chalmers focus their attention 
on the possibility that some aspects at the 
cognitive level can also be extended, as sug-
gested by the well-known Otto and Inga 
thought experiment.32 Having heard of an 
interesting new exhibition at the MOMA in 
New York, Inga remembers that the museum 
is on 53rd Street and goes there. Otto, who 
suffers from a mild form of Alzheimer’s di-
sease, has acquired the habit of writing any 
potentially useful information in a notebook 
that he always carries with him. Thus, when 
he hears of the exhibition at MOMA, he re-
trieves the address from his notebook and 
sets off. 
According to PP, since the functional 
roles of Otto’s notebook and Inga’s biologic 
memory are the same, we should conclude 
that both persons believe that the MOMA is 
on 53rd Street, independently of the fact that 
Otto’s belief comes from a computational 
process exploiting an external support. Thus, 
they have the same extended mental state – 
more precisely, the same mental state, as the 
extended mind is genuinely mental. Let us 
stop and look more closely at this example. 
Which aspect of Otto’s mind has possibly 
been extended beyond his skull? 
A notebook is an inert container from 
which different processes can get the infor-
mation to be elaborated; it is nothing more 
than a big, passive memory store. Now, 
memory is undoubtedly an essential element 
to structure and maintain personal identity 
in time, as remarked by Locke’s prince and 
cobbler thought experiment.33 Locke invites 
us to imagine a prince whose memories are 
all transferred to a cobbler; arguably, in that 
situation we would conclude that the person 
of the prince has been transferred into the 
cobbler’s body. While wholly subscribing to 
this intuition, I cannot but notice that what 
has been transferred in Locke’s thought ex-
periment is not only information, but also 
the capacity to access that information and 
to have what today we would call inferential 
capacities. In other words, there is a simulta-
neous transfer of information and processes.  
On the other hand, Otto’s inferential pro-
cesses, which are essential for mental activi-
ties such as perception, categorization, deci-
sion-making, and abstract reasoning, still run 
in his head. So, rather than speaking of an ex-
tended mind, we should speak of a biological 
mind supported by an external memory. It is 
an interesting, but not “revolutionary” aug-
mentation of his mind. 
Let us now look at Mary, the young cashier 
working in the grocery store near my house. 
Every time she needs to calculate change she 
uses the cash register, even when I give her $3 
to pay for a snack which costs $2.50. As she 
trusts her calculator, she has stopped calculat-
ing the change on her own. Unlike the case of 
Otto’s notebook – but analogous to Locke’s 
thought experiment – what are externalized 
from Mary’s head are not only passive factual 
memories, but dynamic mental processes, i.e., 
that capacity of reasoning and accessing 
memory which, even in the extended para-
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digm, mostly characterizes the mental do-
main. Consistent with the functionalist atti-
tude underlying PP, which is centered on pro-
cedural isomorphism, one could suppose that 
Mary’s mind is more genuinely extended than 
Otto’s. Actually, it is. 
Nevertheless, even Mary’s case does not 
turn out to be fully compelling. No doubt, the 
supermarket cash register, as a pocket calcu-
lator, allows Mary to extend her inferential 
capacities to the algebraic domain; neverthe-
less, planning and decision making are still 
processed by her biological mind. The calcu-
lator does its computational work well, but it 
is always Mary who takes all the non-
algebraic decisions. 
 
█ Cristina and GO  
 
Every day Cristina works for many hours 
at her computer which is always connected to 
the internet. At home, while she is doing oth-
er activities – reading a novel, or cooking, for 
example – she never disconnects. Until re-
cently, when Cristina could not remember an 
historical date, she would have consulted the 
encyclopedia on the shelf; or, when she 
wanted to know where to see the new Ta-
rantino’s film, she would have read the news-
paper. 
Yet, some time ago she began to use a 
good search engine (let us call it GO) and re-
alized that she could save a lot of time and 
get information that turns out to be true 
most of the time. Every time she cannot re-
member some bit of information, Cristina 
asks GO. In fact, she has discovered that the 
output of a query is generally satisfying even 
with fragmentary inputs; actually, she is be-
coming more and more lazy and tends to en-
ter just some query fragments. 
Cristina also bought a smartphone, in or-
der to remain connected the whole day, and 
immediately installed GO on it. Now she has 
GO as her homepage on both the computer 
and the smartphone. Every time she is invi-
ted to her friends’ homes for dinner, at some 
point in the evening someone inexorably asks 
some odd question, about something like a 
rock star from the good old days, or the exact 
location of some historical village in Turkey. 
Immediately, not only Cristina, but also her 
friends – indeed, Cristina has discovered that 
almost everybody has GO installed on his 
/her smartphone – ask GO, and most of the 
time everybody is satisfied by the answers. 
Just a curiosity: are your friends so different 
from Cristina? 
My hypothesis is that, if one subscribes to 
the Extended Mind Model, GO is a better ex-
ample of the extended mind. 
 
█ Some caveats 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, Clark34 is skepti-
cal about the possibility of extending the 
mind by means of search engines such as GO. 
In his view, even the most advanced search 
engines fail to satisfy both the second and the 
fourth criterion for extending the mind. 
Now, we already noticed that the fourth cri-
terion, concerning past conscious endorse-
ment, is doubtful, as it seriously underesti-
mates the importance of subconscious pro-
cesses. 
Concerning the second criterion, I believe 
that Cristina, whose attitude towards GO is 
perhaps epistemologically hazardous but who 
uses GO more and more frequently, does au-
tomatically endorse GO’s results. This is a 
typical heuristic attitude in everyday think-
ing: Cristina uses GO to get information that 
she implicitly considers reliable on average, 
and that she will verify only if she has time 
and strong reasons to do so. Actually, on 
some occasions she uses GO not to get new 
information, but somehow to “defy” the sy-
stem, checking on its truthfulness. 
For example, while Cristina remembers 
very well that in their first recorded version of 
Scarborough Fair Paul Simon and Art Gar-
funkel nested a pacifist song (Canticle) which 
is no longer present in their performance at 
Central Park, she wants to check if GO regis-
tered that information. And it did, with epis-
temic accuracy. Looking forward to the fu-
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ture, the more fluid, automatic, intuitive and 
bidirectional GO will become – and the more 
GO will be able to approximate human choi-
ces – the more it will spontaneously provide a 
flow of information in a reasonable approxi-
mation of Clark’s second requirement.  
Overall, GO seems to satisfy to a certain 
degree the requirement of transparency, 
which we took as a crucial, global constraint 
for extending the mind. The notion of tran-
sparency, as defined by Clark, focuses on the 
way we can make use of a tool, especially with 
respect to the possibility of an optimal inte-
gration of the computational flow. In this 
sense, Cristina and GO are optimally integra-
ted: temporally (she is always connected), spa-
tially (she always has her smartphone in her 
pocket), epistemologically (she trusts it). 
Yet, a tool can also be transparent in a dif-
ferent, stronger sense, if we use it without re-
alizing that it is not part of ourselves. And Di 
Francesco35 rightly wonders whether an ex-
ternal process can ever become as transpa-
rent as “traditional” mental processes always 
are, or whether the notion of transparency is 
rather a sort of metaphor.  
Even if I use my notebook or my smart-
phone as intensively and automatically as Ot-
to does, it would still be reasonable to ask 
myself whether that annotation on the note-
book really is my annotation, whereas it does 
not make sense to ask whether the content of 
my perception is really mine. Nevertheless, is 
it really absurd to suppose that Cristina (per-
haps not now but in the future) takes GO’s 
decisions to be to a certain extent her own 
decisions?  
Looking at how people, and not only ado-
lescents, more and more intensively use such 
a tool, I am beginning to seriously doubt it. 
Reflecting on the possibility of a transparent 
use of GO introduces a new important que-
stion, concerning the possibility of having an 
extended self. Could a technological tool like 
GO become transparent in this second, self-
related sense? I am inclined to see it as an 
open, empirical question, not as a theoretical 
impossibility. 
█ Decisions and relevance  
 
Let us put aside the problem of transpa-
rency, waiting for future decisive technologi-
cal improvements. Or you can even suppose 
that GO will never be transparent in Di 
Francesco’s sense. Still, in my view, Cristina’s 
use of GO represents an interesting step to-
wards the extension of the self, provided that 
we focus on the fact that the self is a complex 
entity, some aspects of which could be ex-
tended out of the skull. What seems crucial to 
me is that Cristina relies on GO not only to 
store data (as Otto does) or to make inferen-
ces (as Mary-and-her-cash-register do, limi-
ted to the algebraic domain), but also to take 
certain decisions, especially those concerning 
the analysis of informational relevance. 
In cognitive sciences the notion of rele-
vance is tied to Dan Sperber and Deirdre 
Wilson’s research.36 In the first instance, a 
piece of information is relevant for someone 
in a certain context if it produces a cognitive 
benefit: ceteris paribus, the more cognitive 
benefits information produces, the more it is 
relevant, where cognitive benefits are mea-
sured in terms of mental representations 
made available to other cognitive or percep-
tual processes. 
Nevertheless, looking for information al-
so has a cost, in terms of inferential, atten-
tional and mnemonic resources. Ceteris pari-
bus, the more intense the cognitive effort 
necessary to get information, the less relevant 
the stimulus will be. Thus, the optimal level 
of relevance is attained when costs and bene-
fits reach a good balance. While it is impossi-
ble to enter into the many technical details of 
the Relevance Theory, it could be useful to 
present the spirit of the approach through an 
example.37 Imagine a conversational excerpt 
like the following: 
 
Andrew: “Would you drive a Mercedes?” 
Barbra: “I wouldn’t drive any expensive car” 
 
Why did Barbra not answer with a simple 
“No”, which, from a Gricean point of view, 
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would have perfectly respected the four con-
versational maxims? Is her lengthy answer 
somehow reasonable? Or perhaps, for some 
reason, is it even more reasonable than a 
simple “No”?  
Maybe in this context this is the case. Af-
ter all, Andrew is not specifically interested in 
Mercedes per se, but has a more general in-
terest in knowing his friend’s attitudes, her 
personality better. And Barbra gives him op-
timal cues, because with a little effort now 
Andrew can infer that: 
 
Barbra would not drive any expensive car. 
A Mercedes is an expensive car.  
Thus, Barbra would not drive a Mercedes.  
 
At the same time, making a supposition 
about Barbra’s encyclopedic knowledge, An-
drew also infers that Barbra would not drive, 
for instance, a Ferrari, Porsche, Maserati, or 
another expensive car. It is a bet that Barbra 
is making in giving her answer: she is suppos-
ing (but cannot be sure) that Andrew will 
benefit from her very informative but some-
how expensive answer – for example, he will 
learn some important facts about her pre-
ferred lifestyle. 
A rather different situation would have 
been created by a different answer, such as 
 
Barbra: “I wouldn’t drive any expensive 
car and (5 + 5 = 10)” 
 
In this case the same set of semantic in-
ferences concerning car preferences would 
have been drawn; but the second conjoint – 
the algebraic expression – would have re-
quired an extra cognitive effort quite unjusti-
fied in the context created by the question. 
Clearly, 5 + 5 = 10, but this algebraic fact has 
no useful role in the context of the conversa-
tion. 
Going back to Cristina, when she enters 
one or more keywords, she has a good chance 
that GO will select a piece of information 
which everybody would have considered re-
levant (in Sperber and Wilson’s technical sense) 
had Cristina obtained it in “the old way” (by 
checking in the encyclopedia on the shelf, 
asking experts, etc.). An example could help 
to clarify this point. It again concerns Simon 
and Garfunkel, together with J.S. Bach and 
Martin Luther. 
 
█ Simon and Garfunkel 
 
Cristina suspects that Simon and Gar-
funkel wrote a song which is based on a well 
known Lutheran chorale, famously exploited 
by J.S. Bach. But she cannot remember that 
song’s title, so she tries to ask GO, entering 
“Simon Garfunkel Bach”. Immediately, GO 
selects as the preferential entry the following 
Wikipedia’s page: “American Tune is a song 
written and first performed by Paul Simon”. 
Some lines after: 
 
The tune is based on a melody line from a 
chorale from Johann Sebastian Bach’s St 
Matthew Passion, itself a reworking of an 
earlier secular song, Mein G’müt ist mir 
verwirret, composed by Hans Leo Hassler. 
The melody used for American Tune can 
be heard quite distinctly in part 1, number 
21 and number 23 and in part 2, number 
53. American Tune’s melody is practically 
identical to that of Mein G’müt ist mir 
verwirret and O Sacred Head, Now 
Wounded, although Simon expanded on 
the tune. 
 
Many aspects of this answer are noticea-
ble. First, GO has selected a Wikipedia entry, 
which on average is a reliable source of in-
formation.38 Moreover, GO has not only 
picked up the relevant information for Cri-
stina in that context (the song’s title: An 
American tune), but it has also selected in-
formation about something that Cristina 
(maybe out of laziness) did not mention in 
the query, but that was an important and rel-
evant step in her thought process: the com-
mon reference to a Lutheran canon. 
GO did not behave as a mere mnemonic 
tool, as would have been the case with the 
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encyclopedia on Cristina’s shelf, as well as 
Otto’s notebook. Rather, it has been capable 
of guessing what Cristina was interested in. It 
surely used no magic nor genuinely inten-
tional intuition: after all, its answer is the 
outcome of an algorithm which (1) has been 
created by a team of human programmers, 
and (2) is capable of learning the users’ pref-
erences and areas of interests. 
Nevertheless, what is important for us is 
just that GO had the same intuitions as Cri-
stina, who for her part did not make any ef-
fort in order to make this relation explicit. I 
suspect that with time Cristina, realizing 
GO’s enormous potentiality, will become 
even more lazy and distracted in formulating 
her queries. For example, if in a hurry, or 
simply a bit ignorant, she erroneously would 
have typed “Simon Garfunchel Bach”, the 
answer would have been (you can try your-
self): “Showing results for Simon Garfunkel 
Bach (the bold is on the GO page)”, followed 
by the same entries (in the same order) as be-
fore.39 In that situation, GO is able not only 
to attribute a sense to a question containing a 
mistake, but also to select a relevant and cor-
rect answer. 
Overall, faced with fragmentary and in-
sufficient inputs GO tries – and very often 
succeeds – in “understanding” what Cristina 
wants to know, and selects results that gener-
ally satisfy her expectancies. One would be 
tempted to say that GO is able to guess what 
Cristina is trying to look for and to find the 
piece of information which is most relevant 
for her in the context. 
Another way to reformulate GO’s per-
formance is to say that it is a skilled attentive 
mechanism, driving our attention to a focus 
that sometimes we are not even aware of 
looking for. This is a crucial point, because in 
envisaging the problem in this way GO 
comes close to solving the most serious diffi-
culty in artificial intelligence: the frame prob-
lem. In other words, the algorithms con-
tained in GO seem able to delimit a know-
ledge domain, thus making the process com-
putationally tractable; this is notoriously a 
task which is trivial for a person, but ex-
tremely difficult for a machine. Yet GO, be-
ing what is called a second generation search 
engine, implements a special process which is 
able to learn from experience as humans do.40 
Overall, Cristina’s use of GO suggests 
that not only some important aspects of Cri-
stina’s mind, but also some aspects of Cristi-
na’s identity, could be extended. (Fortunate-
ly), Cristina is still the real ultimate agent of 
the process; she takes the upper-level deci-
sions, but some other important choices are 
made by GO. We could say that, after a first 
step where Cristina asks the top level ques-
tion, GO becomes an autonomous agent, ca-
pable of finding relevant responses to Cristi-
na’s concerns. And, as long as Cristina con-
tinues to gain confidence in GO’s retrieval 
processes, she will probably increasingly del-
egate her decision-making powers, entering 
more and more fragmentary queries. 
Surely, GO’s decision-making procedures 
are different from ours, but this difference 
does not matter here. Unlike the “old” simu-
lative artificial intelligence, the Extended 
Mind Model is not as much interested in 
“how” an artificial system solves a problem, 
but instead focuses on the results – and, ob-
viously, on transparency. 
 
█ How many Selves? 
 
While possibly agreeing with the analysis 
developed up to now, one could observe that 
the most reasonable way of describing this 
situation consists in supposing that two di-
stinct minds are involved: maybe – one could 
say – GO is too smart to be part of Cristina’s 
mind (and identity); what it implements is a 
second, autonomous mind. 
I do not agree with this objection. To fully 
appreciate the point it is useful to compare 
Cristina’s case with a different situation. 
Suppose that, to resolve her worries about 
Simon and Garfunkel, Cristina asks someone 
– her father, for example. And suppose that, 
her father being a very educated person, as 
Cristina becomes more and more lazy, she 
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begins to ask her father to satisfy whatever 
intellectual curiosity she has. Actually, Cris-
tina exploits her father as intensively as she 
uses GO.  
In this situation, which explicitly recalls 
Diego Marconi’s lazy girls argument,41 I 
would conclude that Cristina and her father 
still remain two autonomous minds, two dis-
tinct subjectivities. Yet, in the interaction be-
tween Cristina and GO the situation is not 
the same. Unlike Cristina, GO does not have 
a point of view, a subjective perspective. 
There is only one phenomenal perspective at 
play, there is no possible conflict between dif-
ferent points of view. 
Even if I am inclined to endorse the ar-
gument from phenomenology, I will not di-
scuss it here, since it is a controversial topic 
that would require a long investigation into 
the different positions held in philosophy of 
mind.42 I would just like to point out that, 
from the phenomenological point of view of 
Cristina, the possible extension of her mind 
through GO would be less interesting than 
the extension through Bach-y-Rita perceptu-
al tools. Provided that – for the reasons pre-
viously noted – neither GO nor the optical 
tools feel, when using the first tool Cristina 
experiences only a mild quale, not compara-
ble to the strong feeling provided by the use 
of Bach-y-Rita prosthesis. 
If GO is to be taken as an extension of a 
biological mind, this is mainly for other rea-
sons, concerning the decision-making dimen-
sion of the self. A distinctive phenomenology 
is typically associated with perceptual pro-
cesses, and GO, differently from a Bach-y-
Rita prosthesis, is not a perceptual system, 
but rather a decision maker, i.e., a prototypi-
cal cognitive system. 
But, again, the system (GO + Cristina) 
could implement at best an extended self, not 
an autonomous agent. On the one hand, GO 
does not have the top level capacity of au-
tonomous decision to trigger a search pro-
cess; on the other hand, once having pro-
cessed the input string, it somehow substi-
tutes itself for the user and goes inde-
pendently onwards. It does not perform the 
higher level work; but its contribution to the 
task is not at all negligible. 
 
█ Conclusions 
 
Contrary to Descartes, the self seems far 
from being a simple and indivisible entity, 
easily accessible to personal scrutiny. On the 
one hand, clinical and developmental studies 
show that interpersonal relations strongly 
modulate the quality of introspective access. 
On the other hand, the extended mind para-
digm seems compatible with the idea that 
some important aspects of the self could also 
be extended to the physical world. This latter 
point acquires special importance when con-
sidering how widespread electronic tools 
such as GO will be in the future. 
 
█ Afterword 
 
I must confess that Cristina is not only 
GO addicted, but she also bought TOM, a 
route planner. It is fantastic, perfectly suita-
ble for Cristina. She is (or maybe was) not 
very good in orienting, but now TOM solves 
most of her problems and has reduced her 
anxiety.  
She used to get a feeling almost like verti-
go when trying to orient herself on a tradi-
tional map, and needed to (mentally or phys-
ically) turn it around to find her position 
with respect to the road network. Now Cri-
stina knows perfectly where she is, because 
TOM tells her in real time. She just has to 
give it some information, being careful not to 
make too many orthographic mistakes. In any 
case, TOM is prudent and always asks for 
confirmation, and only then calculates the 
best route according to the preferences Cris-
tina provides (e.g., the quicker/cheaper/pa-
noramic route). At this point, TOM does not 
need any more assistance: it takes its deci-
sions alone. 
Somehow unfortunately, Cristina no 
longer knows (as she used to) if anything nice 
lies along her route, say a lake, a mountain, 
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the sea, a small village that would be worth 
visiting; but this seems to her an acceptable 
cost to pay. 
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